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One feature of judicial life that strikes most appointees to judicial office 
early on is the silence of the Judiciary outside our judgments and statements 
in court. We are also struck, when we deliver our first judgment that raises 
controversy or higher public interest, by the vulnerability of the Judiciary to 
criticism, sometimes vehement and trenchant. Judges do not answer back. 
With the exception of Chief Justices, judges are generally only heard in 
court, unless the speaking occasion involves an extra-curial or academic 
discussion on the law or judicial life. This is properly so. Yet, when the 
criticism comes, it is troubling. Judges understand the constitutional and 
governmental conventions that operate and within which they work. The 
conventions are not complicated, in fact quite simple. The only regret is that 
they are forgotten or overlooked when the criticism is made. For this 
evening’s purpose I would wish to reflect on the conventions that judges 
work within. I will set out the traditional and modern views on 
parliamentary sovereignty. I will address the doctrine of separation of 
powers and the role of judicial power. I will postulate that, in modern 
government, it is the rule of law that is sovereign. I will consider the judicial 
role and the development of the common law. I will address the topics of 
judicial activism, the election of judges and judicial accountability. I will 
conclude with the view that the complaint of judicial activism is misplaced 
and involves a misapprehension of the judicial function. For some, the high 
water mark of judicial activism was Mabo.1 For some, the nadir of judicial 
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‘inactivism’ was Al Kateb.2 These swings of the pendulum in the discussion 
of judges’ work are not new. In 1956, Boilermakers’3 was an unsatisfactory 
outcome for some. Similarly, in 1948, the Bank Nationalisation4 decision 
provoked criticism. When Chief Justice Dixon restrained the Victorian 
Government from carrying out the execution in Tait,5 criticism ensued. 
However, each time judicial power prevailed over parliamentary and 
executive power. Was that undemocratic? My discussion does not say 
anything new. It has been said before. But, it needs to be said again. I turn 





The role of the Judiciary and the nature of judicial power are unique amongst 
the three branches of government in our democratic system. Unlike the 
political branches, that is the Executive and the Parliament, the Judiciary is 
not held accountable to the people through election. On occasion this leads to 
the misguided conclusion that ‘unelected judges’ have a less democratic role 
to fulfil, or lack democratic legitimacy. But election is not the only hallmark 
of democracy. An impartial application of the rule of law is essential to the 
maintenance of a democratic system. The role of impartial arbitrator of 
disputes between citizens, and between citizens and the state, is best fulfilled 
by unelected individuals who are independent of the effects of politics and 
populism. Independence complements impartiality and provides a means 
through which the Judiciary can apply the rule of law without fear, favour or 
ill-will. 
 
The independent, non-political role of the Judiciary within our democratic 
system creates tension with the political branches of government which fulfil 
a very different function. This tension necessarily leads to some 
disagreement. However, it is an intended consequence of the division of 
power between different bodies and is aimed at avoiding a situation where 






                                                
2 Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562. 
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II PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY AND THE SEPARATION OF 
POWERS 
 
Dicey formulated the comprehensive theory of parliamentary sovereignty. 
This resulted in the concept gaining significant recognition in Britain and her 
former colonies. In Dicey’s view, parliamentary sovereignty is a two-pronged 
concept. It means first, that Parliament may make or unmake any law 
whatsoever; and secondly, that the law does not recognise any other person or 
body as having the right to override or set aside that legislation.6  
 
Academics note that in recent times the correctness of the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty has been increasingly questioned by judges and 
lawyers in Britain, New Zealand and Australia. In Australia, Chief Justice 
Gleeson has observed that ’there has never been, in Australia, a sovereign 
Parliament’ because of the colonial structure established by the Imperial 
Parliament during the nineteenth century.7 New Zealand’s Chief Justice Elias 
commented that our fixation with parliamentary sovereignty and the relative 
democratic merits of the Parliament and the courts prevents us from taking a 
broader perspective. She says that a view of the fundamentals of law as a 
quest for the power that trumps is now obsolete. Rather than looking for 
supremacy between the courts and the political branches we should recognise 
that they have separate functions under the law.8 
 
Each branch of government has its own role to play in the democratic system; 
the Parliament makes the law, the Executive administers it and the role of the 
Judiciary is to interpret the law. These roles are quite distinct and performed 
independently of each other. This independence rests on the doctrine of 
separation of powers. 
 
Put simply, the doctrine of separation of powers recognises the separate and 
unique roles of each branch of government, and that separate and unique 
powers are afforded to facilitate those roles. The primary purpose of the 
doctrine is to avoid the concentration of power in any one authority, thus 
ensuring that no single entity wields absolute power. The division of power is 
intended to create a tension between authorities in order to achieve a balance 
                                                
6 Dicey A V, ‘Lecture II – The Sovereignty of Parliament’ in The Law of the Constitution, 2nd 
ed, Macmillan and Co, London, 1886, 36. 
7 Chief Justice Gleeson, Legality – Spirit and Principle, the Second Magna Carta Lecture 
delivered at NSW Parliament House, Sydney, 20 November 2003. 
8 Chief Justice Elias, Another Spin on the Merry-Go-Round, speech delivered for the Series on 
Sovereignty in the 21st Century organised by the University of Melbourne, 19 March 2003. 
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in the exercise of power. However, in modern government, this is the theory 
but not the fact. 
 
To begin with, it is recognised that there is no binding separation of judicial 
power under the constitutions of the Australian States9 including Victoria.10 
In addition, the bi-partisan nature of politics and the fact that the Executive is 
drawn from the Parliament, means that the division between those two 
branches is now not so distinct. In fact, the power of the Executive has grown 
to a point where that branch has come to dominate the political sphere. What 
was intended to be a three-way division of power has, in reality, largely 
become a two-way spilt, with the threads of tension lying predominantly 
between the Executive and the Judiciary. This exacerbates the potential for 
tension between the two branches.  
 
Judicial power is quintessentially different from the power exercised by the 
Executive and the Parliament. First, judicial power does not function of itself. 
The exercise of judicial power is not initiated by judges themselves. Unlike 
those in India, the higher courts in Australia do not exercise a public interest 
jurisdiction. An aggrieved citizen in Australia who seeks to have the 
government restrained or mandated by the courts cannot simply issue a 
proceeding on the ground of public interest. Rather, judicial power is 
triggered by aggrieved parties bringing a proceeding within the courts’ 
jurisdiction and thus setting in motion the wheels of justice. In contrast, 
Australian governments have the power to decide when and on what topic 
they are to exercise their power. Secondly, judicial power is based upon the 
fundamental tenets of impartiality and independence. The Parliament and the 
Executive function of themselves. They do not operate impartially and 
independently in that they operate politically. So much is expected of the 
legislature and the Executive. Although there may be political consequences 
of judicial decisions, the Judiciary is expected to operate impartially and 
independently and to not act politically. 
 
How then does this affect our notion of parliamentary sovereignty? To say 
that the Parliament is sovereign implies that it is above the other branches of 
government, moving towards the very notion that the separation of powers is 
designed to avoid, that is the concentration of power in a single authority. 
The success of the doctrine of separation of powers rests on the equality of 
the branches of government, the tension between them and their ability to 
provide checks and balances on each other’s power. With the growth of 
                                                
9 See Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 65, 78, 93, 109. 
10 City of Collingwood v State of Victoria [No 2] [1994] 1 VR 652. 
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executive power and dominance of that branch in the political sphere, the 
distinction between the judicial and political branches of government has 
become even more important to avoiding the concentration of power in a 
single authority. 
 
When the separation of powers between the political branches and the 
Judiciary is compromised and the rule of law is flouted, democracy suffers. 
Recent events in Pakistan are illustrative of this. In 2007, the Supreme Court 
of Pakistan issued an interim order against the Pakistani President’s actions 
in suspending the Constitution and declaring a state of emergency. This 
prompted the Pakistani army to enter the Supreme Court building and remove 
the Chief Justice and many other judges. Chief Justice Chaudhry was later 
suspended from office and 60 judges detained from November 2007 until 
April 2008 when the new Pakistani Prime Minister, Gilani, ordered their 
release. The Judiciary in this instance was unable to provide the proper 
checks and balances on a powerful Executive. The result was an exercise of 
state power that was unrestrained except by the exerciser of the power itself. 
It now seems that reinstatement of the judiciary is imminent. The elements of 
democratic government start to revive.11 
 
Despite the fact that strong tensions may exist at times between the Judiciary 
and the political branches, it is this tension that maintains democracy and 
governance under the rule of law. And it is this phenomenon that is 




III THE RULE OF LAW 
 
Given the growth of executive power and its effect on the separation of 
powers, and parliamentary sovereignty itself, it is accurate to say that those 
two theories no longer operate exactly as they were intended. Consequently, 
it may be more advantageous to alter the enquiry. We may benefit from 
abandoning our quest for an omnipotent institution and, rather than asking 
‘who is the supreme or sovereign power’, ask ‘what is the supreme or 
sovereign power.’ And the answer to that question may well be the rule of 
law. 
                                                
11 Since this oration was delivered, eight of the 60 judges sacked by President Musharraf have 
been re-appointed, rather than re-instated. This has caused concern that the independence of 
the judiciary in Pakistan will continue to be compromised through selective appointments 
based on political criteria – see ‘Pakistan judges break ranks to make return’ in The Australian, 
Thursday 28 August 2008. 
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Such an answer is not intended as a repudiation of the concept of 
parliamentary sovereignty. Nor does it threaten the power of the Parliament 
or our elected politicians. Rather, it recognises that the Parliament, like the 
other branches of government, has an important and legitimate function 
within our democratic system. The three branches equally form the apparatus 
of government, functioning together yet separately to promote a democratic 
system of governance. This function cannot be usurped by the Judiciary, just 
as the role of the Judiciary cannot be usurped by the Parliament. But it is a 
role that is carried out under the rule of law. 
 
The common law and the Constitutions of the Commonwealth and the States 
establish a means by which Australian society operates under the rule of law. 
The rule of law protects the rights of citizens and governs their responsibility 
to others. The supremacy of the rule of law ensures that citizens are not 
subjected to the arbitrary exercise of state power. 
 
Governments in this country obey the rule of law as a matter of course. As 
Chief Justice Gleeson points out, governments and their agencies at all levels 
come before the courts to bring and answer proceedings. They are sometimes 
unsuccessful, yet when court orders are made against them they are complied 
with.12 Governments in Australia see themselves as bound by the rule of law 
despite the fact that the role of the Parliament is that of law-maker. 
 
If Australian society and Australian governments operate under the rule of 
law and executive power has grown to dominate Parliament, perhaps it would 
be better to cease our search for a truly sovereign Parliament and instead 
acknowledge that it is the rule of law that is sovereign, not a particular body 
or institution. And, also, that each branch of government has a separate 
function to play in promoting democracy under the rule of law. 
 
 
IV THE JUDICIAL ROLE 
 
Let us turn to examine the role of the Judiciary within such a structure. The 
Judiciary is the vehicle for applying the rule of law. It functions to resolve 
disputes between citizens, and between citizens and the state, and between 
entities of the state. Public confidence in the Judiciary is the source of its 
continuing power and rests on public acceptance of judicial decisions. This, 
                                                
12 Chief Justice Gleeson, Legality – Spirit and Principle, the Second Magna Carta Lecture 
delivered at NSW Parliament House, Sydney, 20 November 2003. 
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in turn, rests on the public’s perception that the courts provide an independent 
and impartial method to resolve disputes. 
 
The separation of judicial power from political power is fundamental to 
ensuring the independence and impartiality of the Judiciary, shielding the 
courts from undue influence by the Executive and the Parliament. The 
interpreter of the laws is separate and independent from the architect of the 
laws. This encourages an objective and impartial application of state power. 
 
Although judicial independence is pivotal to the maintenance of the 
separation between the political branches of government and the Judiciary, 
and thus to the ability of the Judiciary to perform its proper function, such a 
separation has not always been in place. The increasing number of quasi-
judicial tribunals whose members lack security of tenure, indicates that it is, 
in fact, not universal today. 
 
It is informative to briefly survey the historical context of the move towards 
judicial independence. Sir Henry Brooke13 notes that, prior to 1701, security 
of judicial tenure was not a feature of the landscape of English governance.14 
Although there was a brief period in the mid 17th century when the 
maintenance of judicial tenure was based on good behaviour, for the 
remainder both before and after, judges held their office at the pleasure of the 
Crown. It was not uncommon for members of the Judiciary to be sacked. In 
1616, following a series of decisions now foundational to public law, Chief 
Justice Coke of the King’s Bench was sacked. His successor, Chief Justice 
Montague, was warned by the Chancellor that the dismissal ‘was to be a 
lesson to be learned of all, and to be remembered and feared of all that sit in 
judicial places.’ Charles II sacked 11 judges in as many years and his 
successor and brother, James II, sacked 12 in three years.  
 
It was not until the abdication of James II, when the Parliament drew up the 
Heads of Grievances to be presented to the new King, William III, that the 
issue of judicial independence was addressed in detail. The document 
included recommendations for making judges’ commissions continuous, 
provision for judicial salaries to be ascertained and established and for judges 
to be paid from public revenue only, and mechanisms to prevent judges being 
removed and suspended unless by due cause of law. A provision to this effect 
                                                
13 Former Lord Justice of the English Court of Appeal. 
14 Lord Justice Brooke, ‘Judicial Independence – Its History in England and Wales’ available 
at: http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/fb/fbbrook.htm#20 
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was incorporated into the Act of Settlement in 1701, thereby relieving the 
English Judiciary of the prospect of arbitrary removal by the King.  
 
History illustrates the original subordinate role of the Judiciary in relation to 
the Executive and this is indicative of the larger battle fought between the 
Executive and the Parliament. Through a tumultuous period in English 
history, the separation of power between the Executive, the Parliament and 
the Judiciary developed to a point where the doctrine was evident enough in 
practice to be described by Baron de Montesquieu,15 and discussed more fully 
by Sir William Blackstone.16 
 
Blackstone observed that, if judicial and legislative powers were joined, 
 
the life, liberty and property of the subject would be in the hands of arbitrary 
judges, whose decisions would then be regulated only by their own opinions 
and not by any fundamental principles of law: which the legislators may 
depart from, yet judges are bound to observe.17 
 
This observation encompasses a paradox that exists today within our system. 
That is, judges do not only interpret the law made by Parliament; when it 
comes to the common law, they must also make it. 
 
One facet of the judicial function necessarily encompasses development of 
the common law. Precedent is the critical component of the common law. 
The volume of legislation passed by Parliament has increased dramatically 
over the last 50 years; however, the Parliament does not have the capacity to 
legislate in every area. To legislate for every occurrence both foreseen and 
unforeseen is not possible, yet parties in dispute require an answer to resolve 
their situation. In this way, the common law, as developed over the centuries, 
provides a legal framework where there is no statutory law. 
 
Although development of the common law involves judicial discretion and 
judgment, this discretion is not an unlimited or arbitrary power. It must 
proceed on sound judicial method if the legitimacy of the rule of law is to be 
maintained. Views on the precise nature of judicial method vary, however the 
core features are the same; the focus is on process not outcome (this is 
                                                
15 In Spirit of Laws, 1748. 
16 In Commentaries on the Law of England, 1783. 
17 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England, Volume 1, 1978, Garland 
Publishing Inc, London in the Right Honourable Lord Justice Brooke, ‘Judicial Independence 
– Its History in England and Wales’ available at <http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/fb/fbbrook. 
htm#20> 
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maintained by methods of legal reasoning); decisions must not be based on a 
judge’s personal opinion (to do so would undermine the legitimacy of the 
decision and the Judiciary as a whole); and, considerations of fairness may 
only be applied within strict discretionary limits. When members of the 
Judiciary develop the common law, they do so within these limitations, and 
they do so to fulfil their public duty within our system of government. 
 
Like the political branches, members of the Judiciary must operate under the 
rule of law and in compliance with the power granted to them. They must 
develop the common law in conformity with the relevant structures, 
conventions and constitutions. Some may disagree with the outcome, but it is 
not the outcome that is integral to the judicial function, it is the process by 
which the answer is arrived at. Judges disagree on the weight to be given to 
one principle over another and they arrive at different decisions. But, 
provided they steer a course of logic and reason, and draw on established 
legal principle, the process is sound. Provided the common law is developed 
with an eye to fundamental legal principles, the danger envisaged by 
Blackstone is avoided. 
 
 
V JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
 
Disagreement as to the outcome of judicial decisions leads to criticism of the 
courts for frustrating the Parliament’s legislative intentions, thwarting the 
effectiveness of executive policy-making, and engaging in law-making – 
often termed ‘judicial activism’. When such criticisms are made without a 
proper understanding of the judicial function and role within the separation of 
powers they undermine judicial integrity and imply abuse of judicial power.  
 
The word ‘activism’ is often used in a derogatory or critical sense, implying a 
focus on the end result or a desire to bring about change in line with a 
particular judge’s personal opinion or predisposition. This is not a part of the 
judicial function. Judges do not decide what the answer is and then work out 
how to arrive at it. A result-oriented approach is not appropriate to the role. It 
constitutes a breach of the judicial oath.18  
 
                                                
18 See Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) Schedule 3: I…swear by Almighty God that…I will at all 
times and in all things discharge the duties of [office] according to law and to the best of my 
knowledge and ability without fear, favour or affection. 
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When comment is couched in terms of judicial activism, it is often a thinly 
veiled accusation that a particular judge is outcome focused. But one 
struggles to think of an instance where even a so-called ‘activist’ judgment 
was not reasoned along the lines of legal principle and logic. A plurality of 
views, persuasion and disagreement are features common to a democratic 
society at large, and inevitably to the judicial process.  
 
The judicial function necessarily involves an element of discretion and 
judgment. Judges do not simply discover the law as if it had always existed 
and were somehow to be found through tenacious exploration. Choices must 
be made as to how to interpret the Constitution, the meaning to ascribe to 
broadly couched or ambiguous legislative provisions, and in which direction 
to develop the common law where the existing precedents do not provide an 
answer in a new situation. These decisions are not made lightly. They are not 
made on a whim but are carefully arrived at through a process of reason and 
logic.  
 
Most disputes are resolved before they come before the courts. This leaves 
the difficult or vehemently contested disputes to be resolved by judicial 
determination. The courts, save the High Court, do not have the ability to 
choose the cases they hear. The parties most often come before the courts 
because the law is unclear. If there were a clear answer to the dispute they 
likely would not require an independent arbiter to decide the question. Yet, 
no matter how difficult the decision, no matter how important or what 
consequences may flow from it, a judicial officer cannot simply choose not to 
decide, for this would be shirking the responsibility of the office. It is 
incumbent upon a judge, once a case is heard, to provide the parties with an 
answer to their dispute. 
 
Variations in facts mean that different arguments can be made as to the 
application of the rules to present circumstances. Different lines of authority 
may be applied or different interpretations of that authority may result in 
conflicting submissions even thought they are based on the same material. In 
other cases, a new legal question may arise, requiring the application of a 
new rule. Inevitably, judges must use their discretion and judgment to decide 
which of these conflicting arguments is correct. In doing so, judges must seek 
to draw from existing principle to interpret or develop the law in a logical and 
rational way. This is not judicial activism but the proper function of a judge. 
 
Criticism of judges as activists often stems from a disagreement regarding the 
proper outcome of a particular decision. Judicial decisions may have political 
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ramifications and these may, on occasion, be controversial, but there is an 
important difference between political actions and political consequences. 
 
The criteria upon which each judge bases his or her choice, or the weight 
given to any one criterion over another will necessarily differ. Judges are not 
machines. The judicial decision-making process does not have the advantage 
of mathematical certainties. Judges must use their direction and judgment in 
decision-making if they are to discharge their duty. They are provided with 
judicial power on the basis that they will decide the cases before them. They 
do not have the choice not to decide. 
 
An example of this is the situation faced in the recent decision of The Queen 
v Flaherty.19 This was the first Victorian Supreme Court decision to address 
the new requirements of section 6AAA of the Sentencing Act 1991. The 
section requires the court to state the sentence and the non-parole period, if 
any, that would have been imposed but for the offender’s plea of guilty. Such 
a provision is based on the policy that the public interest is served by 
encouraging pleas of guilty, thus minimising the impact of proceedings on 
witnesses and reducing the temporal and financial burden on the justice 
system. It is also aimed at enabling the community to better understand how 
the judge concluded upon the particular sentence.  
 
The factors that are to be taken into account in determining the weight of a 
guilty plea are variable and complex and Flaherty is a good example of this 
complexity. The factors operate on each other to affect the weight of the 
guilty plea, and the guilty plea itself operates on other factors to be taken into 
account in determining the appropriate sentence. The sentencing process has 
been determined at common law to be a process of synthesis. The process is 
not formulaic.  
 
Now, to postulate the case as it would have unfolded but for the guilty plea 
involves an examination of a hypothetical scenario. It is a mercurial exercise 
to separate a guilty plea from the circumstances surrounding it. Nevertheless, 
the Judiciary is bound to uphold and apply the rule of law and must therefore 
make such a separation. Even if the task is difficult (and in some cases it will 
be), the policy aim of the provision is evident and the Judiciary will be 
faithful to the intent of the legislation, upholding the rule of law as passed by 
Parliament, the elected representatives. 
 
                                                
19 The Queen v Michael Patrick Flaherty (No 2) [2008] VSC 270. 
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There are times when a judge will decide a matter, applying the rule of law, 
which leads to an outcome the judge regards as wrong or morally repugnant. 
The personal view of the judge is irrelevant. He or she will decide the matter 
according to law. Although repetitive, the spectre of the judicial oath and its 
significance weighs upon each judge during every day of their term of 
judicial office.  
 
 
VI ELECTION OF JUDGES 
 
The unelected status of judges does not place them outside the democratic 
process. 
 
Along with ‘judicial activism’ the phrase ‘unelected judges’ is employed as a 
means to call into question the legitimacy of the judicial function. The choice 
of appointment, rather than election, of the Judiciary is an important 
distinction that maintains a separation between that arm and the political 
branches. To raise the unelected status of judges as a point to imply that the 
judicial arm is somehow undemocratic, or does not contribute to democracy, 
or leads to judges doing things with the law that are none of their business, 
demonstrates a misguided understanding of the nature of our democratic 
system of governance. 
 
Unelected does not equate with undemocratic. Although members of the 
Judiciary are appointed, they have as much to contribute to the functioning of 
democracy as do members of the political branches. Each branch has its own 
role to play in the doctrine of the separation of powers and each facilitates the 
successful execution of democratic governance in this country. 
 
Arguments against introducing elections for judges are powerful. In 
particular, election politicises judicial appointments and thus interferes with 
judicial independence. This results in the Judiciary potentially being captive 
to a strong Executive with a consequent break-down of the dividing line 
between those who would administer the law and those who would apply it. 
When taken with the lack of clarity in the division between the Parliament 
and the Executive, this would result in the very folly the doctrine of 
separation of powers was intended to avoid – concentration of power in a 
single authority. 
 
Even if an absolute authority is elected, a democratic system of governance is 
not the result. Election is not the sole hallmark of democracy. Montesquieu 
quite rightly observed that the concentration of power in one authority 
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ultimately results in a loss of liberty. If there is nothing to prevent the 
arbitrary exercise of state power, there is nothing to prevent the use of that 
power in an oppressive manner. Regardless of whether the holder of that 
power is elected or not, such a state of affairs is not democracy; it is tyranny. 
 
Certainty is an important factor in maintaining the legitimacy of the rule of 
law. It enables citizens a fair opportunity to foresee how government power 
will be exercised and function accordingly. But complete predictability is not 
possible. This is so in all areas of human endeavour; the law is no different. 
In the law, this disagreement is not only a feature of judicial development of 
the common law; it extends to the interpretation of statute and judicial review 
of administrative action. But it can be protected against through principled 
reasoning, interpretation and development of the law. Certainty of quality of 
outcome can be maintained through application of the proper process. 
 
Recognition of judicial authority depends on public acceptance of judicial 
decisions. As a result, the independence, impartiality and integrity of judges 
are highly important to the maintenance of public confidence in the system of 
government. But public confidence does not equate with popularity. Judges 
must seek to apply the law impartially and objectively. They must not seek to 
please the public, or politicians. Their decisions will, on occasion, be 
unpopular, but so long as they are just and involve an impartial application of 
the law, the Judiciary has discharged its public duty. As Chief Justice 
Gleeson observed, ‘[c]onfidence in the courts includes trusting them to 
pursue justice, not applause’.20 
 
Election for judicial office has a deleterious effect on the independence and 
impartiality of the Judiciary because election places judges squarely in the 
political realm. The principles of justice regularly do not match what is 
politically advantageous. In situations where a fair and impartial 
interpretation and application of the law does not conform to political goals, a 
judge may take the view that to judge according to the rule of law, rather than 
political ends, would be judicial suicide. The effect is a partial application of 
the rule of law. 
 
The possibility that judicial officers must campaign for election creates more 
difficulties. Election encourages candidates to campaign on their own 
political agenda. This very often spills over into decision-making where the 
political agenda for which a particular judge was elected becomes a 
                                                
20 Chief Justice Gleeson, Public Confidence in the Courts, speech delivered to the National 
Judicial College of Australia at Canberra, 9 February 2007, 15. 
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dominating factor in decision-making, rather than the objective of an 
impartial application of the law. A politicised judiciary is less effective in 
providing a check to prevent the arbitrary use of state power. Elected judges 
may also find themselves involved in arbitrating cases involving persons or 
entities who were their campaign donors, or even at risk of political 
corruption.  
 
The criteria for an effective politician and an effective judge must necessarily 
be different. Both have a distinct and separate role to play in the governance 
structure. To incorporate election would collapse these criteria, causing the 
appointment of judges to become a political popularity contest. Of course, it 
happens around the world but we have the best system. Our citizens enjoy a 
quality of democracy developed and tested time and time again over 
centuries. 
 
Being entrusted with power by the citizens through appointment, not election, 
does not bring a special responsibility to discharge one’s duties in a proper 
manner. Such a duty is common to all public roles, whether the officer in 
such a role is elected, as in the case of a politician, or unelected as in the case 
of a judge or public servant. Yet it is the judge who stands between the 
government and the citizen. It is the judge who enjoys long tenure and may 
only be removed by the Parliament. Judges are not removed because of a vote 
of no confidence for politically unpopular decisions. Although they are not 
elected, judges are accountable to the people by other means. Means that are 
more compatible with judicial independence. 
 
 
VII JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
A tension exists between notions of judicial independence and judicial 
accountability. In order to maintain independence and the separation of 
powers, the Judiciary cannot be answerable at the ballot box in the same way 
as a politician may be. Such accountability is incompatible with notions of 
judicial independence which form the basis of the separation of the Judiciary 
from the political branches of government. Judicial accountability exists but 
is necessarily expressed in a different form to the accountability of the 
political branches. 
 
Court proceedings are conducted in public, except in rare instances. Judicial 
decisions are made available to the public. This is one means by which the 
Judiciary is accountable to the public for its actions. When a judicial decision 
is handed down it is accompanied by a usually lengthy discussion of how the 
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decision was made, the reasoning process behind it and the principles under-
pinning it. Generally, court judgments provide a different and more 
comprehensive explanation than that required of politicians for a decision. 
Written judgments expose judicial decision-making to appropriate scrutiny 
by the political branches and the public to ensure accountability. Whereas a 
politician will reach a decision based on various sources of advice, 
consultants’ reports, opinion polls and media sensitivity, the judge engages in 
a very different process of reasoning and judgment.  
 
The appellate structure of our legal system also provides accountability. The 
decisions of lower courts are reviewed and, if error is demonstrated, they are 
supervised by the higher courts. Appellate proceedings are conducted in 
public and the decisions of appellate courts are public. 
 
The media also have a critical role in scrutinising judicial decisions and 
providing a further mechanism for judicial accountability. But, in doing so, 
they should be cognisant of the differences between the political branches 
and the Judiciary, understand the theory behind these differences, and the role 





The three recognised arms of government, the Executive, the Parliament and 
the Judiciary, function together, yet separately, within our system of 
governance. Each must fulfil its role within the boundaries of the powers 
conferred upon it and within the environment of competing powers which 
necessarily creates a tension between them. This tension is one aspect of a 
healthy representative democracy, preventing any one branch exercising 
arbitrary power. The fact that one branch, the Judiciary, is not elected by the 
people does not import an undemocratic element to our system of 
governance. The Judiciary has a legitimate democratic role to play in 
ensuring the maintenance of democracy. Judges are a fundamental part of the 
democratic process. To suggest otherwise demonstrates a misunderstanding 
of concepts fundamental to our system of democratic governance. 
 
Judicial opinion will differ on the proper approach to the discharge of the 
judicial function, but that is the reality of the society we live in – people have 
different opinions, judges are no different. Debate about such matters is a 
healthy indicator of democracy, where a plurality of views can be expressed 
without fear of reprisal. And we should particularly keep this last phrase in 
mind. When the discussion becomes emotive or is designed to elicit a 
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reactionary response, or is in the nature of personal or political attack, we 
devalue our democracy. 
 
 
